Comparative Negligence: Liability of Railroad Companies by Weinstein, Richard S.
Florida Law Review 
Volume 2 Issue 1 Article 8 
January 1949 
Comparative Negligence: Liability of Railroad Companies 
Richard S. Weinstein 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard S. Weinstein, Comparative Negligence: Liability of Railroad Companies, 2 Fla. L. Rev. 124 (1949). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol2/iss1/8 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu. 
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
III. CONCLUSION
In view of the apparent confusion and the inability of the widow to
object to the computation of dower, the next move should be statutory
clarification by the Legislature. If the Legislature desires to retain the
scheme of priority in payment and distribution set forth in the statutes, it
is suggested that dower be specifically expressed as taken from the estate
prior to and absolutely free from all debts of the decedent, family allow-
ance, and costs, charges and expenses of administration.
BoYD H. ANDERSON, JR.
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE: LIABILITY OF RAILROAD
COMPANIES
Florida Statutes §§768.05, 768.06 (1941)
I. HISTORY
At common law, contributory negligence is a complete defense in
an action to recover for injuries negligently inflicted. 1 In the main, this
doctrine applies in Florida today. The ratio decidendi of the courts
stems from the aspect of public policy requiring everyone to take reason-
able care of his person and property. Despite the laudable purpose
underlying contributory negligence as a defense, it early became apparent
that the doctrine did not always have a salutary effect. Many jurisdic-
tions have enacted statutes abrogating the common-law doctrine of con-
tributory negligence in certain cases and substituting a statutory rule
of comparative negligence.2 The application of these statutes is usually
limited to specialized fields of activity such as railroad-crossing injury
cases 3 and workmen's compensation cases,4 although a few states have
'Florida Southern Ry. v. Hirst, 30 Fla. 1, 11 So. 506 (1892); 1 SHEA m.r AND
REDFIELD ON NEGLIGENCE §78 (1941).
'See Note, 114 A. L. R. 830 (1938). England has recently shifted completely to
the admiralty doctrine of contributory negligence in the Law Reform (Contributory
Negligence) Act of 1945, 889 Geo. VI, c. 28.
'MAss. GEN. LAWS C. 160, §232 (1921); VA. CODE ANN. §3959 (1930).
"KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §8481 (McIntosh, 1915).
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enacted more comprehensive statutes.5
The inequalities present in railroad accident cases precipitated, in
Florida, a compelling dictum from Chief Justice McWhorter in Louis-
ville & Nashville Ry. v. Yniestra,6 wherein he decried the lack of any
rule that would aid an only slightly negligent plaintiff in recovering from
a railroad. Presumably railroads were singled out for special treatment
because of their size, danger, and public nature as compared with the
horse and buggy. Liability of railroads for damage done to persons or
property while operating trains is still predicated on the substantial
dangers incident to that type of operation.7 The suggestion of the Chief
Justice was acted upon in the next session of the Legislature, and the
resultant enactments was the predecessor of the present comparative
negligence statutes. These statutes were adapted from the statutes of
the State of Georgia.9 Furthermore, any known and settled constructions
of the Georgia courts not inconsistent with the Florida legislation on
the subject were adopted.'o
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY AND CONSTRUCTION o THE FLORIDA STATUTES
The statute governing the liability of a railroad"2 and the succeed-
ing statute relating to comparative negligence' 2 are in pari materia and
should be construed together.13  Both statutes have been strictly
limited: the former applies to railroads only,' 4 and the latter has been
held inapplicable in an action for death resulting from a collision between
automobile and motor-bus.' 5 The constitutionality of the first statute,
" ssS. CODE ANN. §511; Mole and Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negli-
gence, 17 CORN. L. Q. 333, 604 (1932).
"21 Fla. 700 (1886).
'Grace v. Geneva Lumber Co., 71 Fla. 31, 70 So. 774 (1916).
'Fla. Acts 1877, c. 3744, superseded by Fla. Acts 1891, c. 4071.
"GA. CODE §§3034, 3036 (1873).
"°Florida Cent. & P. R. R. v. Mooney, 40 Fla. 17, 24 So. 148 (1898); Duval
v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85, 15 So. 876 (1894).
"'F.A. STAT. §768.05 (1941).
"'FLA. STAT. §768.06 (1941).
"'Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Webb, 112 Fla. 449, 150 So. 741 (1933).
"'Luster v. Geneva' Mill Co., 102 Fla. 350, 135 So. 854 (1931); Fruit Grower's
Express Co. v. Norton, 95 Fla. 429, 116 So. 234 (1928); Arnold Lumber Co. v.
Carter, 91 Fla. 548, 108 So. 815 (1926).
"Florida Motor Lines v. Ward, 102 Fla. 1105, 137 So. 163 (1931).
2
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the latter portion of which reads, "... the presumption in all cases
being against the company," has been thoroughly tested. Unlike the
Georgia statute from which it was taken verbatim,1 6 the Florida statute
has repeatedly been declared constitutional. 17  The Georgia statute,
however, was struck down as being a violation of due process under the
Federal Constitution.' 8 The difference in the statutes lies in their in-
terpretation. The Georgia courts gave their statutory presumption the
effect of evidence, holding it a part thereof to be weighed by the jury
along with other evidence.' 9 In Western and Atlantic Ry. v. Hender-
son,20 the United States Supreme Court held that "Legislative fiat may
not take the place of fact in issues involving life, liberty, or property."
The Florida courts, on the other hand, have consistently given a uniform
and entirely different interpretation to the presumption of our sta-
tutes. 2 1 The Florida Supreme Court, after setting out the canon of
statutory construction that militates in favor of a constitutional interpre-
tation,22 points out that the only effect of the statutory presumption is
to cast upon the railroad the duty of showing affirmatively that its agents
have exercised all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence; the pre-
sumption is not an integral part of the evidence but merely shifts to the
railroad the burden of going forward. 23 The interpretation comes well
within constitutional due process 2 4 and has the same effect as the Mis-
sissippi statute,2 5 also upheld by the United States Supreme Court. 2 6
1OGA. CODE §§3034, 3036 (1873).
"'Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Voss, 136 Fla. 32, 186 So. 199 (1939); Kirch v.
Atlantic C. L. R. R., 38 F.2d 963 (C. C. A. 5th 1930); see Stringfellow v. Atlantic
C. L. R. R., 290 U. S. 322 (1933).
"8 Western & A. R. R. v. Henderson, 279 U. S. 639 (1929).
"9 Western & A. R. R. v. Thompson, 38 Ga. App. 599, 144 S. E. 831 (1928);
Western & A. R. R. v. Dobbs, 36 Ga. App. 516, 137 S. E. 407 (1927).
20279 U. S. 639 (1929).
"1Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Voss, 136 Fla. 32, 186 So. 199 (1939); Atlantic
C. L. R. R. v. Richardson, 117 Fla. 10, 157 So. 17 (1934); Seaboard A. L. Ry.
v. Myrick, 91 Fla. 918, 109 So. 193 (1926).
2 2United States v. Standard Brewing, Inc., 251 U. S. 210 (1920); United States
v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394 (1916); 3 SUT[aEA.ND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§5904 (3d ed. 1943).
"Seaboard A. L. Ry. v. Watson, 103 Fla. 477, 137 So. 719 (1931).
"U. S. CONST. Amend. XIV, §1; FLA. CONST., Decl. of Rights §12.
2
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"Mobile J. & K. R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35 (1910).
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Nor is the statutory presumption a violation of equal protection of the
laws 27 because not applicable to other common carriers.
28
III. PRoor Op NEGLIGENCE
Ordinary and reasonable care is said to be capable of no hard and fast
meaning but is dependent upon the circumstances of the individual
case. 2 9 Negligence has been defined by the Florida Supreme Court as
"failure to observe for the protection of another's interest, such care,
protection and vigilance as the circumstances justly demand and the
want of which causes him injury."3 0  Under Florida Statutes §768.05
(1941), when the plaintiff has shown that the injury to the person or
property was caused by the operation of a train, the presumption of
fact arises that the railroad was negligent in the operation of its train.
It then becomes necessary for the railroad, in order to escape liability, to
go forward with evidence tending to show due care. 3 ' If any material
evidence is offered by the company, the presumption vanishes and is no
longer of any weight.3 2  This affirmative showing may also be made
by examination of the plaintiff's witnesses.33 The reason for the
presumption is that the person most nearly in a position to know the
facts should bear the burden of showing them affirmatively.3 4 If,
after the railroad has introduced some evidence tending to show due
care on its part, the trial judge instructs the jury as to the presumption,
it is reversible error.35 It is also settled that mere proof of negligence
on the part of the railroad is not in itself sufficient to support recovery;
the fact that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury
must also be proved.38
37FLA. Co sr., Deci. of Rights §1.
"Seaboard A. L. Ry. v. Watson, 103 Fla. 477, 137 So. 719 (1931).
"Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Watkins, 97 Fla. 350, 121 So. 95 (1929).
"Jacksonville Street Ry. v. Chappell, 21 Fla. 175 (1885).
"1 Powel v. Etter, 151 Fla. 866, 10 So.2d 441 (1942).
"Florida E. C. Ry. v. Davis, 96 Fla. 171, 117 So. 842 (1928); Seaboard A. L.
Ry. v. Myrick, 91 Fla. 918, 109 So. 193 (1926); Seaboard A. L. Ry. v. Thompson,
57 Fla. 155, 48 So. 750 (1909).
"Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Webb, 112 Fla. 449, 150 So. 741 (1933).
"Powell v. American Sumatra Tobacco Co., 154 Fla. 227, 17 So.2d 391 (1944).
"Powell v. American Sumatra Tobacco Cd., 154 Fla. 227, 17 So.2d 391 (1944);
Loftin v. Skelton, 152 Fla. 437, 12 So.2d 175 (1943); cf. Atlantic C. L. R. R. v.
Voss, 136 Fla. 32, 186 So. 199 (1939) (trial court improperly charged jury and
Supreme Court allowed error to be cured by remittitur).
"Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Webb, 112 Fla. 449, 150 So. 741 (1933).
4
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IV. DAMAGES
Once the liability of the railroad has been established, then under
the Florida Comparative Negligence Statute, if the jury finds contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, it must apportion the
damages according to the provisions of the statute.3 7 These are deter-
mined by subtracting from the total damages suffered by the plaintiff
an amount constituting that proportion of the total damage which
the negligence attributable to the plaintiff bears to the total negligence,
that is, the combined negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant. In
other words, if the jury finds that the negligence of the defendant is
three times as great as that of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's negligence
is one fourth of the combined negligence of himself and the defendant,
and his recovery will accordingly be reduced by one- fourth.3 8 The
injured party may still recover, despite the fact that his negligence is
greater than that of the railroad. 3 9 If contributory negligence by the
plaintiff is present, the jury is under a duty to diminish the damages.
When it is incontestable that both parties are at fault, and from the
amount of the verdict it is evident that damages have not been di-
minished, the judgment will be reversed. 40
V. DENIAL Ov EQuAL PROTECTION
A serious question arises under the Comparative Negligence Statute
by reason of the changes in conditions since its passage. The common-
law rule of contributory negligence still bars recovery by a negligent
railroad as plaintiff in an accident case, whereas other common carriers en-
gaged in a similar business are permitted to use the statute to their advan-
tage, despite their negligence, in an action against a railroad. In Atlantic
Coast Line R. R. v. Ivey 4 ' the Florida Supreme Court, in striking down
"Seaboard A. L. Ry. v. Callan, 73 Fla. 688, 74 So. 799 (1917).
'"Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Skaggs, 240 U. S. 66 (1916); Seaboard A. L. Ry. v.
Tilghman, 237 U. S. 499 (1915).
' Florida C. & P. R. R. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 25 So. 338 (1899).
"Florida E. C. Ry. v. Townsend, 104 Fla. 362, 140 So. 196 (1932); Florida E. C.
Ry. v. Meacham, 77 Fla. 701, 82 So. 232 (1919); Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Weir, 63
Fla. 69, 58 So. 641 (1912).
41148 Fla. 680, 5 So.2d 244 (1941). The Court added that practically all
cattle in Florida roamed at large in 1889, whereas in 1941 only 301 did so. The
Ivey case was limited to its facts in concurring opinion of Thomas, C. J., in McRae v.
5
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as a denial of equal protection the Florida laws requiring a railroad to
fence its right of way, emphasize the changes in travel conditions since
the passage of the statute in 1899.42 It stated that common carriers
other than railroads owe like duties to the public and are equally charged
with the protection of life and property while in pursuit of their business,
yet they are not compelled to fence their lanes of travel.
In basing its decision in large measure on the advent and growth
of motor carriers as a competing agency of transportation, the Court
was merely recognizing the well-established rule that a statute valid
when enacted may become invalid through changed conditions.43 In
Loftin v. Crowley,4 4 however, involving damages resulting from collision
between a truck and trailer and defendant railroad, occasioned by the
negligence of both parties, the Court held, while discreetly avoiding
expression of any reason therefor, that the Comparative Negligence
Statute was based upon a reasonable classification and that the Legisla-
ture is empowered to classify along reasonable lines.4 5 This decision
expressly did not determine the question of the effect of the Comparative
Negligence Statute when the railroad is the plaintiff in an action against
another common carrier.
VI. CoNcliusIoN
It has not been the purpose of this note to consider within its scope
the possibility of applying the doctrine of comparative negligence to all
actions, as has been done in some jurisdictions and in the admiralty
courts. Since, however, automobiles have been declared dangerous
instrumentalities in this jurisdiction by court decision, 4 6 and since the
dangerous nature of railroad operation has long been a dominant factor
Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Ry., 156 Fla. 200, 23 So.2d 76 (1945). Contra: Ft.
Worth Ry. v. Welch, 147 Tex. Cr. R. 634, 183 S. W.2d 730 (1944).
"FrA. CoMw. Gmi. LAWS §6669 (1927).
"Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U. S. 405 (1935); Kansas City Sou.
Ry. v. Anderson, 233 U. S. 325 (1914); Poiddexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270
(1884).
"150 Fla. 836, 8 So.2d 909 (1942). The decision itself goes no further than to
apply the Comparative Negligence Statute to a defendant railroad, and to refuse to de-
dare it unconstitutional merely because motor carriers are not made liable under
similar circumstances.
"Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Ford, 287 U1. S. 502 (1933).
"Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920).
6
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in sustaining the statutes under discussion, it could logically be argued
that in these times the guaranty of equal protection of the laws governing
common carriers is being denied in the case of the railroads. At the
date of passage of the present Comparative Negligence Statute there was
no comparable danger to persons or property from any common carriers
on land other than railroads. It is noteworthy that the other great
common carrier of older days, the ship, was already subject to the com-
parative negligence doctrine, which was developed in admiralty. Since
then the conditions have changed radically. The basis for comparative
negligence remains the same, but other instrumentalities of public trans-
portation have entered the class in fact. The number of motor carriers
of both passenger and freight traveling the roads and highways has
increased to such an extent that the danger from their operation
is abundantly clear and requires corresponding remedial legislation if that
which now applies solely to railroads is still to be regarded as reasonable.
"The constitutional right of equal protection of the laws means that
everyone is entitled to stand before the law on equal terms with, to enjoy
the same rights as belong to, and to bear the same burdens as are
-imposed upon others in like situations."'4 7 A statute intended to remedy
unjust situations is today causing an injustice; and as a result it is open
to serious criticism for failure to include the other common carriers
along with railroads in protecting the public.
RicinRD S. WEINSTEIN
"'Caldwell v. Mann, 157 Fla. 633, 26 So.2d 788 (1946).
7
Weinstein: Comparative Negligence: Liability of Railroad Companies
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1949
